Sam Howell

Qualifications

BCom University of Otago (major in Finance) 2021
LLB University of Otago 2021
Admitted to the Bar in New Zealand 2022

Contact

DDI: +64 7 262 0438
M: +64 27 963 7760
E: sam.howell@hobec.co.nz

Sam is a civil litigation lawyer.

He is well-versed in commercial, company, construction and insolvency law matters and regularly appears for clients in the District Court and High Court. Sam provides litigation support to the Independent Bar across the North Island and has experience appearing as sole or junior counsel. Sam also acts as counsel on a wide range of criminal matters, including drug-related offences. He aims to provide pragmatic and commercial advice to all his clients.

Sam grew up in Dunedin and enjoys living in the Bay of Plenty. Outside of work, Sam volunteers at Baywide Community Law and tutors at the University of Waikato.

Sam Howell's Expertise

Civil Litigation & Dispute Resolution

Sam Howell's News & Resources

What protection do you have as a business purchasing goods? Contract and Commercial Law Act

Everyone knows about the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 (CGA), which provides a “consumer” with remedies if a business has failed to provide goods or services to a reasonable standard. But what happens if you are a business purchasing goods? The answer is not found in the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993; it is found in the Contract and Commercial Law Act 2017 (the CCLA). The CCLA implies seven conditions and/or warranties in a contract for the sale of goods: right to sell; conformity with description; fitness for purpose; merchantable quality; conformity with samples; rights of examination, and; acceptance. Not every breach of contract allows for rejection, but a trivial breach of a condition does. This means that a buyer can return goods supplied to a seller. Importantly, whether a term is a condition or a warranty depends on the construction of the sale of goods contract. An important implied condition is “fitness for purpose”. This means that goods must be reasonably fit for purpose. But, unlike the CGA, this condition will only apply where the buyer makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and that the goods are of a description that it is in the course of the seller’s business to supply. What this means is that when a buyer of a vehicle makes known to the seller that they will be using a vehicle to tow a caravan, then there is an implied condition that the vehicle is fit for that purpose; towing a caravan. This was the case in Finch Motors v Quinn (No 2) [1980] 2 NZLR 519. Mr Quinn, the buyer, told the seller that he wanted a car for towing a boat on extended trips. The seller, Finch Motors, told Mr Quinn they had the ideal car for the job. Not long after the sale, Mr Quinn used his car to tow the boat when it overheated. This, the Court found, was a breach of the implied condition that goods are fit for purpose. There is also an implied condition that goods are of a “merchantable quality”. This is similar to “acceptable quality” under the CGA. The test for whether goods are of a “merchantable quality” is found in an old case, Taylor v Combiner Buyers [1924] NZLR 627. In that case, the Court asked the following question: Are the goods of such a quality and in such a state and condition as to be saleable in the market, as being goods of that description, to buyers who are fully aware of their quality, state, and condition, and who are buying them for the ordinary purposes for which goods so described are bought in that market? Unlike the CGA, the CCLA allows contracting parties to vary or exclude the implied conditions and/or warranties. This includes fitness for purpose and merchantable quality. To do this, the contract must be clear as to the conditions and/or warranties that it purports to vary or exclude. In Wallis, Son & Wells v Pratt & Haynes [1911] AC 394 (HL), for example, the seller’s terms and conditions stated that there is “no warranty express or implied”. The Court found that this did not exclude implied conditions, only implied warranties. If the seller wanted to exclude the implied conditions, including fitness for purpose and merchantable quality, they had to do so expressly. Holland Beckett has experience advising buyers and sellers. This is a complex area of law and Holland Beckett is available to assist.

Shareholder Disputes – you are not without options

Shareholder disputes are not uncommon. Yet, when they arise, a shareholder dispute is nothing short of disruptive, distracting and – usually - detrimental to business. While shareholder disputes can take various shapes and sizes, they most commonly involve a shareholder disagreeing with the way in which a company is being managed; or shareholders becoming “deadlocked”. Regardless, a shareholder has a range of options at their disposal to resolve disputes with fellow shareholders. The starting point for any shareholder dispute regularly involves an informal/formal meeting, mediation or arbitration. Each of these options has its merits and can be tailored to suit almost any shareholder dispute. It is also worth bearing in mind that shareholder agreements typically contain dispute resolution clauses. These clauses set out the process that must be followed to address disputes between shareholders. However, should these fail, a shareholder may need to file court proceedings. We explore the options available to shareholders under s 174 of the Companies Act 1993 (the Act). Oppressive conduct? Under s 174 of the Act, a shareholder may seek relief from the Court provided it can satisfy two elements. Firstly, proving that the affairs of the company have been, or are likely to be conducted in a manner, or the conduct of the company is, “oppressive, unfairly discriminatory, or unfairly prejudicial”. Secondly, the Court must consider it “just and equitable” to make an order for relief.[1] For the first element, the question is whether there has been a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing, viewed in light of the history and structure of the particular company and the reasonable expectations of its members.[2] Such a departure does not need to be conducted in bad faith.[3] The focus is on the conduct’s effect on the complaining shareholder. As such, s 174 is designed to provide a broad and flexible remedy for conduct which is unjustly detrimental on a shareholder. Unfair prejudice will arise in cases of company mismanagement, failing to facilitate a return for shareholders, excluding shareholders from participation and access to financial records, directors acting self-interestedly, and operating a company for the benefit of its parent. Green v Gillette was a recent case example in which the Court of Appeal made an order under s 174 of the Act.[4] Mr Gillette and Mr Green were shareholders in SunPower Limited. Mr Gillette was also employed by SunPower. When SunPower experienced financial difficulty, it ceased paying Mr Gillette’s salary, causing a deterioration in the shareholder relationship. Mr Gillette stopped working for SunPower and brought proceedings against it in the Employment Relation Authority. Subsequently, Mr Green incorporated a new company – “SunPower Solar Limited” – which acquired SunPower’s assets and workflow. Mr Gillette had no knowledge of these transactions. The Court had little difficulty finding that this amounted to unfairly prejudicial conduct. Other forms of unfairly prejudicial conduct can include “cash” or “asset” stripping. This can occur, for example, when a holding company charges illegitimate or overinflated management fees to its subsidiaries.[5] The Act also deems certain conduct as unfairly prejudicial.[6] Such “deemed” conduct gives rise to an irrebuttable presumption of unfair prejudice.[7] An example of this, is a failure to obtain a special resolution of shareholders in respect of a major transaction. Relief? What type of relief can a shareholder expect to receive from the Court? A “buyout order” by the majority shareholder is the most common remedy.[8] This is because cases often involve tightly held companies in which members can no longer do business together. That being said, a buy-out will not always be appropriate. If a shareholder (or director) devalues the company, a buy-out would not adequately resolve the wrong to the complaining shareholder.[9] A buy-out may not also be appropriate when a company is difficult to value.[10] Importantly, compensation may be awarded against director of companies, as “any other person” under s 174(2)(b).[11] The important point is that the suitable form of relief is that which repairs the actual harm done. The courts may also wind-up a company under s 174 of the Act. Having said that, such a remedy is considered “blunt” and “drastic” – especially when dealing with a solvent and successful business. A liquidator may be appropriate where steps need to be taken to recover funds properly owed to the company,[12] which could include a shareholder’s overdrawn current account. It may also be necessary to grant compensation alongside liquidation.[13] Conclusion All of this is to say that, while shareholder disputes are frustrating, you are not without options. The Companies Act 1993 provides other mechanism to address shareholder disputes and the above is an example of one such option. The above is only very general guidance and should not be relied on as legal advice. Companies Act 1993, s 174. Thomas v H W Thomas Ltd [1984] 1 NZLR 686; (1984) NZCLC 99,148(CA) at p693,155 (referring to the s 209 of the Companies Act 1955); affirmed in Sturgess v Dunphy [2014] NZCA 266 at [138]. Sturgess v Dunphy [2014] NZCA 266 at [139]. Green v Gillette [2022] NZCA 408 Oppenheimer NZ Ltd v Struthers [1994] MCLR 156. Section 175. Kim v Pink Nails Ltd HC Hamilton CIV-2009-419-1472, 11 August 2010. Sturgess v Dunphy at [148]. Kyle v Huapai [2014] NZHC 1981, at [14]. Hayes v Taniwha Buses Ltd [2014] NZHC 1965. See, for example, GJ Holding Trustee Ltd v Frith [2023] NZHC 563; and Maryatt v PC Home Hire Ltd HC Auckland M269-SD00, 2 September 2002; (2002) 9 NZCLC 263,033 at [92]. Ross v Smith [2012] NZHC 3034, at [24]. Kyle v Huapai Enterprises Ltd [2014] NZHC 1981, at [14].

Buying property with family – fun or potential fiasco?

In the present economic climate, getting into (or climbing) the property ladder is tough. To get a deal across the line, purchasers are increasingly looking to alternative ownership options. One such option we commonly see is ‘co-ownership’ of property between family members. Taking matters a step further than the traditional parental guarantee of a child’s purchase, we are now seeing co-ownership between multiple relatives (such as siblings and their spouses, or parents and all/some of their children). This is despite that not all owners intend to live in or maintain the property. While this sounds good on paper, unfortunately these arrangements often proceed without the appropriate documentation and can go wrong. Untangling them can be complex where there has been intermingling of purchase funds, family members not being treated equally, deaths occurring and relationships souring over time. What to do if you want to buy property with other people? If you are buying property with others (often who are not your spouse or partner), you should have a written agreement to cover key aspects. The terms can cover: ownership shares and monetary contributions to purchase (including bank loans); who will live in the property; who will pay property expenses and maintenance; what will happen if someone wants to sell the property and others don’t; what happens on death of a party; and how will any proceeds of sale be distributed. This way, if a dispute does arise there will be a clear path forward to minimise any fall out (if possible). Property Sharing Agreements are used to document these arrangements, which are simple but effective. Purchasers can also consider whether funds should be gifted or loaned. Our property lawyers can assist you with this process. You can also read our article on Gift v Loan. If you are wanting to buy property with your partner or spouse, there are a different set of questions and documentation to consider (for example, whether you need a contracting out agreement). Our dedicated family team can advise you on all aspects of relationship property. See also our article on Contracting Out Agreements 101. When it goes wrong A recent example of an undocumented family property purchase is the case of Boot (As Executor and Trustee of Estate of Hart) v Stephens [2023] NZHC 3863. Parents (the Harts) helped their daughter and her husband (the Stephens) buy a property. The title said that each couple owned a 50% share of the property, but in reality, the Stephens contributed more to the purchase price. They also paid for most of the property expenses in that time. Years later, both the Harts died, and their other five children wanted to sell the property so that 50% of the sale proceeds could be distributed to the children via their mother’s estate. The Stephens claimed that they were entitled to 67% of the property. Additionally, they had lived in the property for 17 years and did not want to sell. Ultimately, the Court held that, given the family’s intentions and contributions, the Stephens were entitled to 66% and could buy out the estate’s 34% interest. Regrettably, the dispute and litigation took a toll on the siblings’ relationships. If you own property with your family and there is a dispute There are a number of options to resolve a dispute if there is no written agreement, including obtaining Court orders to force a sale under the Property Law Act 2007. First and foremost, our experienced litigation lawyers can help you to resolve matters before Court through negotiation or mediation, if possible. If negotiations are not successful, we can guide you through the litigation process.

Restraint of Trade

The Court of Appeal recently released a judgment concerning the scope of a restraint of trade clause, following the sale of a business. The business bought by the purchaser involved the manufacture, distribution and installation of partitioning systems and door systems, commonly used in office fit-outs. Shortly after the sale, the vendors bought another business that was a supplier of components of partitioning and door systems. The sale and purchase agreement signed by the parties included a restraint clause that sought to prevent the vendors from engaging in any business that was “the same or substantially similar to” the business being sold to the purchasers. Importantly, the restraint specified the business activities it sought to protect: “namely the manufacture, importation distribution or installation of … partitioning systems or door systems”. The purchaser believed that the vendor was in breach of the restraint of trade clause given the relatedness of the products being sold, and the High Court agreed. However, the Court of Appeal thought differently. Overturning the decision of the High Court, the three judges held that the business activity of each business was not the same or substantially similar on account of the fact that the business that was sold by the vendor dealt with complete systems, while the business that was bought dealt only with components of such systems. In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied on the specific wording in the restraint clause. Because the clause named complete systems only, and because componentry could not be regarded as a complete system and only a small part thereof, there was no substantial similarity. The decision has highlighted the importance of using wording in a restraint that will provide the parties with the certainty required for them to understand the parameters of what is being agreed. Had the clause used in this situation included the further wording: “namely the manufacture, importation distribution or installation of … partitioning systems or door systems, and including componentry of such systems”, There is a possibility this matter would have been decided differently or may never have made it before the Courts in the first place. Of course, expanding the scope of a restraint of trade clause too widely may result in it being deemed invalid. So, the specific wording used should be carefully considered and seek only to extend the scope of protection to a reasonable level. If you need any advice or assistance in determining the reasonableness or validity of a restraint of trade clause, please remember that it is better to seek help prior to making any big decisions. You may save yourself the headache of being embroiled in legal action and be in a position to move forward with confidence.

Trade Marks – another trader is using a similar brand name, what can we do?

Firstly, do you have a trade mark registration? If so, and if the other trader is using the same or a confusingly similar brand name in relation to the same or similar goods or services then it is likely you have the right to prevent the use and could make a request that the other trader immediately stop using your intellectual property. However, if the other trader was already using the brand name before you filed your application, there is a chance that you will have to either accept that another trader using a similar brand name in the market place, or you could potentially negotiate with the other trader to see if you can come to some sort of pragmatic solution. If you do not have a trade mark, the issue becomes a bit more uncertain. We have had situations where clients have been happily using brand names on their products, only to then receive a polite but firm “cease and desist” letter directing them to stop using the name because it infringes a trade mark registration they own that predates the first use by our client. In one particular instance, our client was using what appeared to be a really novel and unique name on a food product, only to be told they were infringing a trade mark owned by a major American company (a.k.a. a trade mark owner with big pockets for paying legal expenses and little interest in negotiating with a small New Zealand company). The main problem for our client was that they had spent a fairly hefty amount on graphic design and marketing for their product and had six months’ worth of packaging already bought and paid for. The task of having to delete every photograph or reference to the trade mark on their social media pages was tiresome, but re-educating their customers about the name change also proved to be a headache (same great product, just with a way better name …). That is why we would always recommend carrying out thorough clearance searches before you set your heart on a particular brand name, and why it is preferable to obtain a trade mark registration for your cracking great brand names. It can save time, money and hassle down the track and give you peace of mind right from the start. We can help you conduct thorough research and investigate your ideas before your products or services are put to market and, once you have confirmed your brilliant brand name is available, we can help you with any trade mark applications you may wish to file.

Update on trust law – can a trustee consider settlor wishes or other trust benefits?

Trustees and beneficiaries of trusts should be aware of a recent court decision, which clarifies two factors that trustees can take into account when deciding whether to distribute trust assets. In December 2021, the Court of Appeal’s decision in Kain v Public Trust [2021] NZCA 685 has given trustees some guidance on whether two types of factors can or should be considered by trustees. These are: A settlor’s wishes after the trust was established; and If a beneficiary has received (or can expect to receive) a benefit from a separate but related trust. Settlor’s later wishes When establishing a trust, a settlor expresses their intention (or wish) for how the trust’s property is to be used. Later on, a settlor may convey further or different wishes for the way in which they want the trust property to be used. The Court of Appeal held that: A trustee is entitled to take into account wishes and subsequent wishes if they are consistent with the terms and purpose of the trust. To do this, a trustee can read and understand these wishes; and If the more recent wishes are inconsistent with the settlor’s original wishes, a trustee can consider the more recent wishes, however it is a matter for the trustee’s discretion to actually give effect to those recent wishes (in effect overriding the original wishes). An example would be, as in the Kain case, if there is a statement by the settlor wanting equality between beneficiaries that is not contained in the trust deed. Depending on the circumstances, this wish for equal treatment may be able to be taken into account by a trustee, but those wishes do not have to be followed. Interrelated Trusts The Court of Appeal confirmed the general principal that a trustee must take into account all relevant considerations, and not take into account any irrelevant ones. The Court then held that where there are multiple trusts that are related (ie. are connected to one family group), it can be relevant what a beneficiary has received (or might be expected to receive) from a related trust. But it is not a requirement to do so. For example: There are two trusts relating to the Smith family, Trust A and B. Peter is a beneficiary of both. Mary, the trustee of Trust A, wants to make a decision in relation to Trust A’s assets. Peter has received a house from Trust B. Mary can take account of the house which Peter has received from Trust B when making her decision, but she does not have to. At Holland Beckett, our litigation and estate lawyers can guide trustees through making difficult decisions, or can give advice to beneficiaries about decisions that have been made by trustees if you think the decision is wrong. Please do not hesitate to get in contact.